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Abstract 
 
 
The paper extends Marx’s law of value to include the effects of risk. It shows how 
risk has its origins in the labour process and is transferred between labour and capital 
on an unequal basis and between capitals on a zero sum basis. An empirical test is 
then presented, which shows that the employment of labour increases risk from the 
point of view of the investing capitalist. The conclusion is that the employment of 
labour is a curate’s egg from capital’s point of view. On the one hand it is essential for 
the production of sustainable surplus value and therefore for competitive advantage 
and capital accumulation. On the other hand employment of labour renders such 
accumulation inherently risky and therefore commensurately more costly to the 
rational capitalist investor.  
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The Labour Theory of Value, Risk and the Rate of Profit 
 
Introduction: The social origins of financial risk 
Classical economics shows that labour is the source of value and that surplus arises 
from exploitation, or the capitalist’s non-payment for some positive proportion of 
labour effort. In general, it can be shown that the accounting or money rate of profit is 
related to the underlying rate of surplus and can be positive only if the underlying 
surplus is also positive (Robinson, 1953). Where Marxist and Neo-Ricardian 
economists and critical accountants have addressed the issue of value they have 
concentrated only on value theory and rent (for example Steedman, 1977 and Cohen, 
1981), neglecting risk. Similarly Bryer (1999a) suggests that labour values are the 
basis of objective asset valuations from the perspective of the balance sheet, but does 
not consider the pricing of risky assets in financial markets.  
The principles governing financial accounting today follow from Marx’s 
analysis of the circuits of industrial capital (Bryer, 1998, 1999a, 1999b), but again, 
these circuits are abstracted from the notion of risk in the associated cash flows. In 
Marx’s analysis, risk is only partially present and in most cases Marx assumes certain 
cash flows. Bryer (1994) suggests that Marx’s method can incorporate risk if the cash 
flows described are certainty equivalent and that Marx’s notion of the equalisation of 
returns through the development of the insurance market is consistent with the market 
portfolio of modern financial theory. However the notion of certainty equivalent 
assumes a market mechanism that can carry out appropriate discounting. The 
contention of this paper is that risk is rooted in difficult to observe labour processes 
and does not in itself spring from the market mechanism in other than a zero sum 
fashion.  
Tinker, (1999, p.655) meanwhile suggests that Marx’s economic categories 
such as profit, wages and rents should be seen as socially relative phenomena. It 
follows that risk and the pricing of risk should also be seen in these terms. A recent 
study has extended both these perspectives to include consideration of risk (Toms, 
2005), This paper extends the theoretical reconciliation of the labour theory of value 
to the capital asset pricing model in Toms (2005) and provides an empirical test of the 
social determinants of systematic risk. 
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Profit and risk: a theoretical model 
The extension of Marx’s framework to include risk is appealing for several reasons. 
First, financial risk itself cannot be manufactured or created out of nothing. Where 
markets in risk are created, for example derivatives markets, they are zero sum games 
(Telser, 1981). Mere gambling is socially unnecessary and does not promote 
economic development. Alternatively such markets can be justified in terms of social 
necessity where risk is a negative externality. For example, farmers may wish to 
hedge against exogenous climatic risk to their crops by selling forward, which they 
can do for a price. Once market relations are entered, risk becomes financial, with its 
aggregate level socially determined. The development of double-entry bookkeeping 
assisted its quantification (Bernstein, 1996, p.21). Risk is also approximately fixed in 
its aggregate, but with individual participants suffering disproportionate increases and 
others benefiting from corresponding weighted reductions. Changes in risk can thus 
be related to changes in society. For example capitalism and its institutions developed 
in part because powerful social groups were able to transfer risk onto weaker groups. 
Land-owning peasants displaced from the land and forced to sell their labour suffered 
a major increase in risk, trading secure for insecure employment. Capitalist employers 
on the other hand, were able to hedge their risk through providing work without 
security, notwithstanding lower wages.   
Second, if it is accepted that the source of value lies in the production process 
and specifically with the actions of labour, then the creation of value through the 
expenditure of physical effort and even more so through mental effort, is imperfectly 
observable by the overseeing capitalist. Most management accounting techniques are 
intended to overcome this problem in one way or another. Imperfect observation is a 
source of risk to the employing capitalist arising directly from the source of 
production. Using Marx’s categories, the ratio of surplus value to variable capital 
(S/V) contains information asymmetries within certain bounds of labour process 
control.  
Third, recent trends such as the attempt to create a flexible workforce, 
supported by the writings of management theorists (eg Atkinson, 1984) and labour 
market reformers, have the appearance of an attack on the rights of workers. 
Armstrong (2001) describes fixed overhead bases within firms as employment 
‘shelters’ (Freedman, 1984), used as a defensive reaction by employees against the 
threats of casualisation and unemployment. Associated growth of employment 
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insecurity using official statistics has been documented for the closing decades of the 
20th century (DeGrip et al, 1997). Armstrong (2000, p.386) and Hopper and 
Armstrong (1991) argue the role of accounting controls is to extract more effort for a 
given wage bill, and in addition to throw the costs of economic fluctuations onto the 
workforce. 
Attacks on fixed cost shelters are increasingly common, but their purpose is 
not entirely consistent with a theoretical framework based only on value in the 
absence of risk. According to a more limited framework based on value alone 
capitalism is motivated to maximise the absolute mass of profits, albeit with the 
corollary of a declining rate of profit. In such circumstances capitalists have the 
incentive to establish, not dismantle, fixed cost shelters, for example by investing in 
high fixed cost high-throughput production techniques. Only in conditions where total 
profits were expected to enter a phase of long run secular decline would the policy of 
dismantling cost shelters make sense. However, this problem disappears if value 
flows are stochastic and profit (qua rent plus surplus) can also be equated with risk 
transfer between social groups. Now the capitalist’s incentive incorporates risk 
minimisation or risk adjusted value maximisation, seeking the maximum rate of 
profit, but with minimum variation in the profit rate. At the limit, such variation can 
be reduced to zero where labour and other costs are made to vary perfectly with the 
realised value of output. The transfer of risk from capital to labour in this sense is 
rational, consistent with Marx’s underlying framework and explains why profit 
maximising capitalists may nonetheless avoid high fixed cost and high absolute profit 
opportunities. 
There are several potentially interesting implications, explored next in more 
detail. The first is that the observed rate of profit will differ from the rate of profit 
computed from socially necessary values according to the risk associated with the 
underlying business cash flows. The difference consists of rent, accruing to the 
capitalist where the observed profit is greater, and to a third party where it is less. For 
example if a capitalist rents land at a fixed price, the risk to the landlord is zero, since 
his return is guaranteed. Meanwhile the risk is made proportionately higher for the 
capitalist as the rate of profit varies with changes in demand. In this case there is a 
rent transfer from the capitalist to the landlord. Where agreements vary, such that the 
capitalist can escape commitment to rental payments in the event of a downturn, eg by 
leasing arrangements, short notice withdrawal etc, the risk is transferred from the 
 5
capitalist to the landlord. In general, risk (ß) faced by an individual capitalist i 
depends on the relative variability of the rate of profit (surplus, S) with the variability 
of aggregate S for the whole economy, m.  
 
ßi  =  ∆Si/(Si+Vi+Ci)     (1a) 
   ∆Sm/(Sm+Vm+Cm) 
 
More precisely, assuming no other cost categories, it depends on the ratio of fixed 
rental (FR) to total rental cost (TR) relative to the aggregate ratio for all firms in the 
economy: 
 
ßi  =  FRi/TRi ÷  FRm/TRm  (1b) 
 
For the individual capitalist, the expected money profit rate (S/M), where M = money 
capital (comprising S + V +C), is equated to the underlying cost structure as follows: 
 
 si/Ci =  RFm +  (sm/Cm - RFm)ßi  (2) 
 
From the point of view of the individual capitalist, insofar as the cost structure is 
determined by the rental conditions imposed by landlord, j, whose income varies 
accordingly, risk is determined by: 
 
 
ßi  = si/Ci -  sj/Cj  + {( sm/Cm) - RFm}ßj  (3) 
      (sm/Cm) - RFm
     
In other words the ß risk co-efficients of the two social groups are in a linear and 
inverse relationship.1
In the neo-classical literature, transfers of risk between market participants 
have been modelled extensively, but risk transfers within and as part of the labour 
process have been ignored, both by the neo-classical literature and the Marxists, 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, a single capital turnover is assumed throughout. 
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thereby preventing useful extensions to the CAPM.2 Significantly, the Marxists, 
including accounting researchers have also ignored these social dimensions of risk 
transfer. Intuitively this suggests that value and risk need to be equated in classical 
economics, value theory and accounting theory just as they are linked by the neo-
classical capital asset pricing model.  
To accommodate risk arising from the labour process, assume that at the limit, 
the transfer of labour effort into the labour process is observable only by the 
individual worker. This follows logically, but is more obviously true where the labour 
process is mental as opposed to physical.3 If the output is physical this is more 
directly observable by supervisors. It is also more obviously true where production is 
team-based and there is an uncertain and potentially unascertainable number of 
permutations of team membership, each of which is likely to result in sub-optimal 
team performance to some degree (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). In general, without 
perfect oversight, labour can earn rents or the capitalist can spend money on 
supervisory and other costs. In aggregate, the costs might be expected to be equal and 
amount to a zero sum game, although their aggregate level will vary across sector or 
across firms within sectors insofar as the labour processes differ.  
The final assumption to be relaxed in the model is the assumption of the single 
period capital turnover and the implied automatic realisation of all invested capital. 
Where these conditions do not hold, further elements of risk are introduced through 
finance and realisation lags (Foley, 1986, p.68). In these cases the effects of fixed 
elements of variable and constant capital result in accentuated risk and higher required 
rates of return for the capitals involved. 
On the surface, the formulations above look like an extension of the CAPM 
approach. In contrast the main problem for the CAPM approach is that its inputs come 
from market prices, mostly without reference to the underlying determinants of profit. 
If the argument is that risk is leveraged from the underlying cost structure, as an 
                                                 
2 Some of this research has examined the valuation of human capital using a financial 
markets perspective (Richard, 1975; Svensson and Werner, 1993; Koo, 1998, Quin 
(2002). Quin’s HCAPM sheds light on the empirical evidence of the effects of human 
capital on securities’ expected returns reported by Campbell (1996).  
 
3 Even where the effort is mental, the labour process is still potentially subject to de-
skilling, although constant revolutionising of the production process may prevent de-
skilling for a time, as argued by Braverman (1975). 
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extension of financial leverage per the Modigliani and Miller (1958) formulation, then 
there are clearly some weaknesses for the conventional method of accommodating 
systematic and residual determinants of risk in individual companies. To identify 
discount rates, the starting point of the ‘conventional’ method is to identify a quoted 
company already engaged in the proposed line of business. Next, share price data is 
used to estimate the quoted firm’s beta. To strip out the effects of borrowing in the 
quoted firm’s capital structure, the ‘equity’ beta is then adjusted through an un-
gearing process. The resulting ‘asset’ beta is then re-geared, to reflect the proposed 
financing of the project in the firm conducting the investment (Watson and Head, 
p.254). There are several problems with this approach. First, the estimate of the 
quoted firm’s beta depends on historical share price variation (usually over a five year 
period), during which period there are distorting events and random shocks. These 
past data are not necessarily suitable for forecasting the future. Second, other factors, 
such as firm size and potential financial distress also impact on aggregate systematic 
risk. Empirical research shows that equity beta does not substantially explain the cross 
section of stock market returns, whereas these alternative factors might (Fama and 
French, 1996). Third, from an internal management point of view, accountants rely on 
expensive financial databases or other forms of costly data collation. Their purpose 
though is to obtain a proxy for risks, which in substantial part are more perfectly 
observable within the firm through analysis of cost structure and underlying contracts. 
Capital market analysis may imply a beta of one value, whereas the assumptions 
derived from the business planning process rely on budgetary assumptions about cost 
behaviour, which may imply a beta of a quite different value. In other words, 
management accountants understand cost behaviour for budgeting purposes, but do 
not factor it into risk adjustment in their NPV analysis. Fourth, at no point in the 
conventional procedure is the value of the asset beta checked with reference to 
underlying fundamentals. Although the operating leverage method is referred to in 
some finance texts, it is not used extensively and has not been developed to include 
aggregate or cost-category based betas, for example to measure systematic risk arising 
from the employment of labour. 
These are important causes of inaccuracies at the individual firm’s level. On 
average, however, there might still be a relationship between fundamental cost 
behaviour and share price reaction. A crucial point, however, which allows the above 
objections to stand, is that the causality assumed here is from accounting 
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fundamentals to stock market response. The traditional method begins with the stock 
market and works backwards, but in incomplete fashion. 
 
 
An empirical test 
From the above discussion several likely empirical relationships can be inferred. 
Because risk to the capitalist is a function of the underlying cost structure of the firm, 
which in turn reflects the contractual arrangements between capitalists, other 
capitalists, workers and landlords, the fixity or variability of these arrangements 
affects the distribution of profits and risk between the social groups. More 
specifically, it follows from the above discussion that the risk from the point of view 
of an equity-holding capitalist will be a function of the level of aggregate fixed cost. 
These costs can be grouped into those associated with the financing of the firm, 
proxied by financial leverage and residual fixed costs proxied by the operating 
leverage.  To examine the effect specifically of labour cost and its degree of fixity, a 
labour beta can be calculated using (2) above as a proxy. It is possible to extend the 
approach to consider all categories of cost, but as labour is the most common category 
across industry sectors and the key theoretical variable of interest, the empirical 
research was limited to this category only. In differences in risk might be expected as 
a function of differences in the organic composition of capital. This is best proxied by 
grouping firms according to industry norms. To test the influence of these factors on 
observable risk, proxied by market equity betas, data was gathered for each proxy in 
the following model: 
 
β = a0 + + a1BLAB + a2DOL + + a3DFL + a4LtoS + a5G + a6MC + a7,1D1  
+ a7,2D2 + … + a7,n-1Dn-1 + e (4)
 
where β for each company in the sample is obtained from Datastream. D1, D2, …, Dn-
1 the industry dummy variables, n the number of industries in the sample.  
BLAB is a proxy for labour risk arising from specifically the fixed costs of 
labour. It is calculated as follows: 
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BLABi = Si/(Si+Vi) / (Sm/(Sm + Vm) (7)
 
Where Si and Vi are respectively the surplus defined as sales minus labour cost and the 
labour cost of firm i. Sm and Vm represent corresponding averages for the market as a 
whole. The components of both were obtained from Datastream using five-year 
averages.  
The use of the Degree of Operating Leverage (DOL) to explain beta has been 
the subject of a limited number of indecisive studies (Lev, 1974, Brenner and Smidt, 
1978; Gahlon and Gentry, 1982; Mandelker and Rhee, 1984, Li and Henderson, 1991, 
Lord, 1996), none of which use recent UK data. When estimating leverage effects, 
most of these studies rely on regression methods. However there are a number of 
disadvantages associated with this approach. For both of the regression techniques, 
the underlying assumption is that leverage does not change during the estimation 
period. Moreover a sufficient estimation period is required, which is expected to be 
longer than the beta estimation period of 5 years commonly used in practice. In the 
tests conducted below, following Lord (1996), DOL is used to proxy for the presence 
of fixed cost, as follows:  
 
DOL = %∆X / %∆S (5)
 
Where %∆X and %∆S are the percentage changes in earnings before interest and tax 
and in sales respectively, both of which are obtained from Datastream. For each firm 
the ratio is calculated for each of the five years 1999-2003 inclusively and then 
averaged. The Degree of Financial Leverage (DFL) calculated in similar fashion as 
the percentage change in profit after interest associated with a percentage change in 
profit before tax, or mathematically,  
 
DFL = %∆Y/%∆X  (6)
 
and where Y is the profit after-interest and X is the profit before interest.  
In addition to the fixity of labour cost measured by BLAB, it is also useful to 
consider labour intensity, measured by the labour cost to sales (LtoS) ratio. It is 
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computed by the ratio of annual total employment costs to annual sales. 
Notwithstanding the empirical research concerned with finding the determinants of 
beta, the inclusion of BLAB and LtoS are unique to this study.  
Growth rates, size, and industry membership are control variables and joint 
proxies for the organic composition of capital. Equity growth rates (G) are calculated 
as follows: 
 
G = Et/ Et-1
(8)
 
 
Where G is the growth rate and E is the equity capital (share capital and reserves item 
in the balance sheet). According to the predictions of the standard CAPM and 
dividend growth model formulations, growth is an important determinant of equity 
beta.4 Size is measured by market capitalisation (MC), which is the product of the 
market price and the total number of shares outstanding. All the above measures are 
simple five-year averages for the years 1999-2003 inclusive. There are significant 
effects of industry group on beta even after controlling for the underlying firm’s 
balance sheet characteristics (Rosenberg and Guy, 1976), and some sectors are more 
or less insulated from general economic events (Rosenberg and Rudd, 1982). To 
capture these effects, the sample were grouped into industry sectors most likely to 
pick up these effects, for example cyclical and non-cyclical (CYC and NCYC), 
general industries, basic, utilities and resources (GENIN, BASIC, UTIL, RESOR) and 
information technology (ITECH). Taken together the control variables coupled with 
DFL provide a parallel test of the conventional view of the CAPM determinants of 
beta. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used. The DOL, LtoS, G 
and MC variables were log transformed to approximate more closely to normality, but 
as table 1 shows remained significantly non-normal. In view of the kurtosis in these 
variables, sensitivity tests using non-parametric quantile (median) regression were 
                                                 
4 β = DY + G/ (Rm – Rf) where DY is dividend yield. 
 
 11
favoured over outlier deletion. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors were used 
in all appropriate regressions. Results are summarised in table 2. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Model 1 shows the results for the full model including all the industry 
variables.5 All non-industry co-efficients are significant except the log-transformed 
DOL variable and the DFL variable. By definition, the DOL variable overlaps the 
BLAB variable. However, DOL remained insignificant when the BLAB variable was 
dropped from the model, suggesting noisy interactions in the non-labour elements of 
fixed cost. Models (2) and (3) show progressively parsimonious models, excluding 
first the lnDFL, lnG and the insignificant industry variables, then DOL, which was 
consistently insignificant in all models tested. Of the industry variables only utilities, 
non-cyclical and information technology were consistently significant. In the former 
two cases the relationship was negative, suggesting membership of these industries 
was likely to reduce beta. LtoS was significant in all models tested suggesting a 
positive relationship between labour intensity and beta. Growth and size control 
variables were also consistently and positively significant. 
Models (4) and (5) show the significance of BLAB in isolation from the other 
variables. Model (5) is a non-parametric specification to test for the sensitivity of 
outliers in the non-normally distributed BLAB variable. The consistent positive 
significance of the BLAB variable relative to the more generally defined DOL and the 
complementary significance of LtoS suggests strong support for the hypothesis of 
socially determined risk. Fixed labour cost combined with labour intensity, accounts 
for a considerable degree of variation in corporate beta. In contrast more general fixed 
cost, proxied by DOL, and DFL does not explain risk. This result should not be in the 
least surprising, given the definition of the BLAB variable and the specification of the 
model. However, the empirical proof is worthwhile, because conventional financial 
                                                 
5 ‘Basic Industries’ (n=31) was the industry category chosen for exclusion. 
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analysis ignores these relationships. Finance texts are full of calculations on how to 
adjust the equity beta to control for the presence of fixed interest charges. However, 
there is nothing on how to deal with fixed labour cost, or indeed any other fixed costs, 
notwithstanding their obvious impact on the variability of equity cash flow.  
The significant and positive relationship between information technology 
stocks and beta is to be expected given the ‘dot-com’ boom, which took place during 
the years of the survey. However, the interpretation here is different vis-a-vis prior 
studies. Consistent with the argument in earlier sections, risk arises from social 
interactions and the organic composition of capital in this sector differs as a function 
of its physical capital, knowledge base and asymmetric information between 
promoters and equity investors. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Market analysts tend not to rely on ratios incorporating labour values. However the 
conventional approaches are misplaced, as the variability of labour cost provides a 
great deal of explanation of the variability of share prices. The relationship is not 
surprising, since as has been shown, as labour is the source of value and profit, the 
variance of profit naturally depends on the variance of labour. Therefore the 
employment of labour is a risky proposition from the point of view of the capitalist. 
Rational capitalist behaviour accordingly comprises the employment of labour and 
concomitant attempts to offload associated risk.  
Analysis of risk in this fashion, with reference to accounting fundamentals promotes 
accounting in a research agenda hitherto dominated by financial economics and 
addresses research questions that have not been addressed satisfactorily by 
conventional methods. (For example the value of a share can be ascertained by 
accounting fundamentals instead of regressions of noisy and historic stock market 
data). It has been suggested that a problem for the UK economy is that the influence 
of stock market-based finance promotes short-termism in firm investment behaviour. 
In particular, this promotes the use of artificially high investment hurdle rates and 
attenuates the level of investment. So far this research agenda has been addressed by 
economists (see Mayer, 1997, for a review) and the issue has been the subject of 
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considerable recent debate (Hutton, 1996). The accounting-based empirically driven 
survey proposed here will add new dimensions to the issue and to the research 
evidence. Risk management will remain high on the agenda. The EU’s Modernisation 
Directive (2003/51/EC), to be implemented in member states in 2005 requires 
directors to give attention to the major risks and uncertainties faced by their 
businesses. 
From the point of view of capital and capital theory, labour-based systematic 
risk acts as a constraint on the development of the productive forces. Such risk can be 
reduced in the extreme case through total alienation in the labour process, so that 
workers are de-skilled and substitutable (Marx, 1976, p.788), combined with total 
transparency and flexibility so that they are remunerated using piece rates and can be 
fired with no notice. However, if Marx’s argument is developed so that labour’s 
contribution extends beyond the mere physical and mechanical, under circumstances 
of total transparency and flexibility they can add no further value through innovation 
and creativity in the labour process beyond that currently contained, thereby 
preventing the development of the productive forces. This is a fundamental 
contradiction of capitalism. 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
   
Panel A: Variable 
descriptors 
 
Variable mean sd skewness kurtosis swilk 
pval 
 
beta 0.911 0.353 0.204 2.942 0.391  
blab2 0.848 2.485 1.224 8.143 0.000  
lndol 1.084 1.518 0.531 3.643 0.003  
lndfl 0.141 0.537 0.768 6.932 0.000  
lnltos -1.677 0.582 -0.391 2.609 0.017  
lngrow 0.153 0.204 0.970 5.826 0.000  
lnsize 6.034 1.335 0.589 2.689 0.000  
basic  0.188  
cyc 0.513  
genin 0.094  
itech 0.044  
ncyc 0.106  
resor 0.025  
util 0.031  
   
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 beta     blab    lndol     lndfl    lnltos    lngrow    lnsize 
   
beta 1  
blab 0.1698 1  
lndol 0.0982 0.0671 1  
lndfl -0.0117 -0.0277 -0.0773 1  
lnltos 0.2281 0.2162 0.0906 -0.1197 1  
lngrow 0.0725 0.0597 -0.297 0.0455 0.0588 1 
lnsize 0.2061 -0.0668 -0.0218 0.0644 -0.1071 -0.1199 1
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1 Shapiro-wilk test of normality. P-value indicates probability that the variable is non-
normally distributed.
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Table 2: Determinants of equity beta  
   
Dependent variable = beta  
  Model  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent 
variable 
 
Blab  0.020 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.028 
  (2.09)** (2.23)** (2.59)*** (2.21)** (2.08)** 
Lndol  0.022* 0.018    
  (1.41) (1.22)    
Lndfl  -0.029     
  (0.43)     
Lnltos  0.070 0.071    
  (1.91)** (2.12)**    
Lngrow  0.112     
  (0.75)     
Lnsize  0.116 0.115 0.114   
  (5.98)*** (6.15)*** (5.91)***   
Cyclical  -0.041     
  (0.81)     
Genin  0.017     
  (0.19)     
Itech  0.256 0.292 0.336   
  (2.32)** (2.85)*** (3.22)***   
Ncyc  -0.446 -0.422 -0.447   
  (4.44)*** (4.22)*** (4.39)***   
Resor  -0.029     
  (0.25)     
Util  -0.847 -0.866 -0.857   
  (7.84)*** (8.36)*** (9.91)***   
_cons  0.355 0.356 0.259 0.891 0.877 
  (2.38)** (2.76)*** (2.29)** (31.59)**
* 
(21.12)**
* 
       
N  160 160 160 160 160 
F  11.91 20.77 25.47 4.89  
R-
squared1
 0.413 0.406 0.387 0.028 0.020 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Notes:  
1 Adjusted in models (1)-(4), which are specified as ordinary least squares, and psuedo 
in (5) which uses median regression. 
Bracketed figures are t-values, and in models (1)-(4) are based on White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent variance matrix. They are based on positive one-tailed 
tests for the continuous variables and two tailed tests for dichotomous industry 
variables. 
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